### Outweighs

#### Extinction outweighs – as long as there is some life there’s only a risk they retain ontological capacity

Hans Jonas (Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich) 1996 “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

### A2: Perm

#### Dualisms are key to the momentum of the revolution- need unifying enemy to be able to maintain the vitality of the movement against global capitalism

#### Reform and critical dissent are absorbed by the power of the system- ecological collapse is inevitable in a world where capitalism exists

Magdoff and Foster, 2010

(Fred and John Belamy, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, “What Every Environmentalist Needs to Know about Capitalism”, Monthly Review, Volume 61, Issue 10) NG

There are some people who fully understand the ecological and social problems that capitalism brings, but think that capitalism can and should be reformed. According to Benjamin Barber: “The struggle for the soul of capitalism is…a struggle between the nation’s economic body and its civic soul: a struggle to put capitalism in its proper place, where it serves our nature and needs rather than manipulating and fabricating whims and wants. Saving capitalism means bringing it into harmony with spirit—with prudence, pluralism and those ‘things of the public’…that define our civic souls. A revolution of the spirit.”45 William Greider has written a book titled The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy. And there are books that tout the potential of “green capitalism” and the “natural capitalism” of Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, and L. Hunter Lovins.46 Here, we are told that we can get rich, continue growing the economy, and increase consumption without end—and save the planet, all at the same time! How good can it get? There is a slight problem—a system that has only one goal, the maximization of profits, has no soul, can never have a soul, can never be green, and, by its very nature, it must manipulate and fabricate whims and wants.¶ There are a number of important “out of the box” ecological and environmental thinkers and doers. They are genuinely good and well-meaning people who are concerned with the health of the planet, and most are also concerned with issues of social justice. However, there is one box from which they cannot escape—the capitalist economic system. Even the increasing numbers of individuals who criticize the system and its “market failures” frequently end up with “solutions” aimed at a tightly controlled “humane” and non-corporate capitalism, instead of actually getting outside the box of capitalism. They are unable even to think about, let alone promote, an economic system that has different goals and decision-making processes—one that places primary emphasis on human and environmental needs, as opposed to profits.

#### A rejection of ontological and linguistic boundaries reinforces capitalism – not only will the material basis of capital will recreate entrenched attitudes, this rejection will destory binaries such as class that are the only method of truly confronting material oppression

DeFazio 12 (Kimberly, English Professor at University of Wisconsin Lacrosse, Winter/Spring 12, Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkingandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm)

A broader point that needs to be made here is that, while for Heidegger the problem is the subject/object binary, and for posthumanists it is the human/animal distinction, what they all reject as metaphysical thinking is the logic of the "binary" which is the structuring principle of class society. Class societies, in which a few control the labor and products of others and thus have control over the lives of the majority, necessarily create cultural and conceptual divisions which codify these class relations. Conceptual divisions have their material roots not in the mind but in the world which the mind reflects, through more or less complex mediations. This is one of the basic principles of materialism: ideas are not the product of the (individual) mind; rather, social consciousness is shaped by social existence. Therefore changing how people think and thus act (whether to oneself, other humans, animals or the environment) requires changing the material divisions that produce othering. Philosophy which simply does away with conceptual distinctions in thinking, as Heidegger and other romantics do, not only gets rid of the very concepts (like "class," "exploitation," "determination") needed to understand the structuring principles of class society, but, in effect, displaces material change of objective conditions onto the subjective change of the individual. This is the essential politico-cognitive work that neoromantic theory does for capital. Whether through such concepts as Keats' "negative capability" Kant's "sublime," Heidegger's "Being" or "the question of the animal" that is the more recent focus of such writers as Derrida, Wolfe, and Calarco, romantic machine-thinking celebrates the dissolution of boundaries: between self and other, subject and object, philosophy and poetry, rich and poor, the social (as city) and nature. It constructs a post-rational linguistic realm of higher values which exceed restricting social codes and conventions. Boundaries, in romanticism, are viewed as the imposition of cultural codes and linguistic conventions that rigidly delineate, not as material (as effects of labor relations). It is through the replacement of "mechanical" concepts with speculative ones that romanticism blurs social boundaries and epistemological distinctions in an effort, not to transform capitalism, but to find a freer mode of thinking within it. As Wordsworth puts it in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads, it involves taking familiar incidents and "throw[ing] over them a certain colouring of imagination"—or, in the updated idiom of posthumanism, a "revolution in language and thought" (Calarco, Zoographies 6).¶ Heideggerian pre-reflective experience, like "the question of the animal," isBy blurring lines, romantic theory seeks, as Heidegger puts it, "the liberation of language from grammar" ("Letter on Humanism" 218), rather than social transformation. To liberate language from grammar is of course to free up thinking (from cultural bounds), to suspend the social structures of language and, according to Heidegger, to come closer to understanding Being. Grammarless language is thus the fantasy of the plentitude of meaning outside of the social. No matter how adamantly posthumanism co in short the space in which "abstract" binaries like class (not to mention other social differences) evaporate. ndemns Heidegger's human-centered thinking, the very de-essentializing strategies it deploys to challenge human-animal distinctions are informed by the (Heideggerian) desire to escape existing social conventions, through the relay of the animal.

#### Even if there is no objective meaning to our existence – elites can still manipulate social relations for bad purposes – we should form counter-ideologies to challenge them – otherwise oppression and violence are inevitable

Charlie Bertsch (Ph.D. , English at UC-Berkeley) 1995 “Useful Fictions” Bad Subjects Online Journal Issue #19 http://bad.eserver.org/issues/1995/19/bertsch.html

Obviously, if we agree that an individual's will is constructed by social forces, then it becomes impossible to say that individuals are in complete control of their actions. Likewise, if we agree that qualities like race, gender, and sexual-preference are imposed on an individual by those forces, then it becomes impossible to state that a given individual is essentially anything. More generally, if we agree with this model, we are forced to acknowledge that the notion that individuals possess identity-in-the-singular is itself a construct. That is, we must acquiesce to the superficially radical idea that all identity is a fiction. We get a very different picture of transformational identities when we consider them in the light of this model. It suggests that transformational identities are not a special case, but the norm: if there can be no fixed identities, then what we have been calling 'transformations' are the only identities we have, plain and simple. Although this model suggests that all identities are fictional, its more extreme proponents — usually called 'post-structuralists' — reserve special animosity for the idea that the different identities an individual performs can somehow add up to a coherent 'self,' an identity-in-the-singular. They imply that the more time an identity must span and the greater the number of individual actions it must therefore encompass, the more dangerous it becomes. In a way, this is to argue that the problem is not which identities are made or how they are made, but that they sustain themselves at all. Unfortunately, if we draw this sort of conclusion from the constructivist model of identity, it is nearly impossible to imagine substantive political action. Almost all political action requires concerted effort towards a definite goal over time. And such effort, in turn, requires a reasonably stable identity. After all, it is impossible for individuals to strategize unless they know that they will have the same general goals tomorrow that they have today. In radically critiquing the idea of identity-in-the-singular, the post-structuralists who draw this conclusion ultimately promote passivity. Hegemony, Ideology, and Identity Of course, it is one thing to realize that all identity is a fiction, but quite another to decide what to do with that insight. We can draw other conclusions to from the constructivist model of identity, ones which can enable political action rather than inhibit it. In order to get a better sense of what they might look like, we need to take a detour through theory more directly concerned with the workings of society as a whole. When Marxist social theorist Antonio Gramsci looked at the Western world of the 1930s, he saw that vast numbers of people appeared strangely content to live within a power structure that runs counter to their own best interests. In trying to account for this phenomenon, Gramsci realized that the ruling class in modern societies does not rule by threat of force alone. He theorized that the majority of people in such societies behave themselves, not only because they fear punishment, but also because they consent to the power structure that maintains the status quo. Indeed, since most people do not break the law or seek to overthrow this power structure, it can be said that their consent plays a bigger role in perpetuating the dominance of the ruling class than does their fear of punishment. Gramsci called the achievement and maintenance of this consent 'hegemony.' Two aspects of Gramsci's theory of hegemony are particularly significant for our thinking about identity. The first is that he describes hegemony as a kind of cultural 'glue' able to bind and hold together very different sectors of modern societies, even ones which have little or nothing in common. As Stuart Hall phrases it in an article entitled 'Gramsci and Us,' hegemony 'does not reflect, it constructs a 'unity' out of difference.' The second aspect relates to the way hegemony manages to accomplish this. Because it resolves real differences into a semblance of unity, hegemony requires the creation and sustenance of an illusion. To put this another way, hegemony depends upon a collective fantasy in which conflicting sectors are perceived to be somehow alike, a fantasy that these sectors share a common identity. Hegemony is, in other words, a fiction of collective identity. But how does this relate to the issues surrounding individual identity that we have been discussing? Gramsci doesn't talk about individuals much, except to discuss the ways in which they bond together in organizations. As I will explain later, I think it might be good to start thinking about individuals in terms of collective identity. For now, however, we can turn to another Marxist social theorist who tried to build on both Gramsci's insights into collective identity and Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic insights about individual identity. In the essay 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation' from which Bad Subjects derives its name, Louis Althusser revises the traditional Marxist definition of ideology. Instead of contrasting the illusions of ideology to the 'truth' of reality as Marx had implicitly done, Althusser argues that there is no escape from ideology. 'Ideology,' he writes, 'represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.' Because our minds always 'mediate' (or filter) our relation to reality, it is not possible for us to have direct access to it. Instead, we only have indirect access to reality through the socially constructed fictions with which we define ourselves and our place in the world. To rephrase this insight in terms of our topic, because identity takes shape when we distinguish between what and where we are, and because it is socially constructed, it derives from our imaginary relationship to our real conditions of existence. We could say that, if ideology represents, then identity is a principal effect of that representation. If all identity is a fiction, then it must be ideology that creates and sustains that fiction. As we can see, Althusser clearly argues for a constructivist model of identity. Where he differs from the post-structuralist proponents of this model whom we discussed earlier, however, is in his distinction between ideology-in-general and ideologies in the plural. 'Ideology-in-general' refers to the inescapable fact that we can never access reality directly: we always perceive it through what Lacan called the 'imaginary,' through fictions. Ideologies, on the other hand, are the historically specific fictions with which people of a given place and time make sense of themselves and their relation to the world. Making this distinction allows us to conclude that, while we cannot escape ideology-in-general, there is a lot at stake in determining which specific ideologies dominate our lives. This returns us to Gramsci's notion of hegemony. Since hegemony really depends on the creation and sustenance of a collective fiction of identity, it is really just a specific ideology that holds sway over the majority of people in a society. As Althusser's argument suggests, hegemony is therefore not eternal, but something that can be challenged by other specific ideologies. From a leftist perspective, challenging hegemony requires the creation of an alternative fiction of collective identity. That is, if we wish to disassemble a particular power structure, it is not enough to say that it is bad. And it certainly isn't enough to show that it is glued together by a fiction that resolves real differences into a semblance of unity. Rather, we need to provide a different logic with which to make society cohere, one in keeping with our political goals. Clearly, the idea that all identity is a fiction need not induce passivity. If, as Althusser argues, there is no political action, no 'practice except by and in an ideology,' then we must construct fictions of identity adequate to our political project. Those adherents to the constructivist model of identity who are so suspicious of identities that can be sustained over time seem to forget that, as Karl Marx puts it in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 'men make their own history,' though 'not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted.' They forget, in other words, that the social forces that construct identity result from the collective activity of human beings. Indeed, from Bad Subjects' leftist perspective, the strength of this model comes from its recognition that identities are made, not found. That its proponents would forget that the social forces that construct identity are themselves made, not found, seems remarkable. Useful Fictions As we mentioned earlier, we live in a society that, for all of its modernity, still reserves a prominent place for fantasies of transformation. The majority of these fantasies, however, narrate metamorphoses in which individuals change more or less independently of the society around them. When we do get narratives in which individual transformation is more closely linked to collective transformation, such as in science-fiction tales of the 1950s or Star Trek: The Next Generation's stories about the Borg, they tend to be extremely pessimistic. While becoming a vampire or murderer can give a character personality and even glamour, becoming a standardized cog in an impersonal machine cannot. What all this suggests is that, although we need to imagine transformation, we are encouraged to imagine it only as individual transformation. This is a phenomenon leftists would do well to consider. Certainly, there are times when it is useful to imagine individual transformations. As several articles in Bad Subjects have attested, autobiographical 'conversion' narratives can be a powerful way of communicating with people who might ignore an explicitly political message. In the long run, however, our goal is not just to 'reach' people, but to organize them into a new and better society. The left needs to turn the idea of transformation on its head. We do not need narratives of individual transformation within a society that does not change. Instead, we need to construct fictions of identity that inspire individuals to work for social change; fictions of identity that are predicated not on the individual's opposition to society, but on her or his integration into it; fictions of identity in which individuals act, not as autonomous individuals, but as part of a collective movement; fictions, finally, that are worth believing in

### 2NC Alt

#### capitalism is unsustainable and reforms only insure the crash is worse—this makes total rejection key

Magdoff and Foster, 2010

(Fred and John Belamy, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, “What Every Environmentalist Needs to Know about Capitalism”, Monthly Review, Volume 61, Issue 10) NG

The foregoing analysis, if correct, points to the fact that the ecological crisis cannot be solved within the logic of the present system. The various suggestions for doing so have no hope of success. The system of world capitalism is clearly unsustainable in: (1) its quest for never ending accumulation of capital leading to production that must continually expand to provide profits; (2) its agriculture and food system that pollutes the environment and still does not allow universal access to a sufficient quantity and quality of food; (3) its rampant destruction of the environment; (4) its continually recreating and enhancing of the stratification of wealth within and between countries; and (5) its search for technological magic bullets as a way of avoiding the growing social and ecological problems arising from its own operations.¶ The transition to an ecological—which we believe must also be a socialist—economy will be a steep ascent and will not occur overnight. This is not a question of “storming the Winter Palace.” Rather, it is a dynamic, multifaceted struggle for a new cultural compact and a new productive system. The struggle is ultimately against the system of capital. It must begin, however, by opposing the logic of capital, endeavoring in the here and now to create in the interstices of the system a new social metabolism rooted in egalitarianism, community, and a sustainable relation to the earth. The basis for the creation of sustainable human development must arise from within the system dominated by capital, without being part of it, just as the bourgeoisie itself arose in the “pores” of feudal society.54 Eventually, these initiatives can become powerful enough to constitute the basis of a revolutionary new movement and society.¶ All over the world, such struggles in the interstices of capitalist society are now taking place, and are too numerous and too complex to be dealt with fully here. Indigenous peoples today, given a new basis as a result of the ongoing revolutionary struggle in Bolivia, are reinforcing a new ethic of responsibility to the earth. La Vía Campesina, a global peasant-farmer organization, is promoting new forms of ecological agriculture, as is Brazil’s MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra), as are Cuba and Venezuela. Recently, Venezulean President Hugo Chávez stressed the social and environmental reasons to work to get rid of the oil-rentier model in Venezuela, a major oil exporter.55 The climate justice movement is demanding egalitarian and anti-capitalist solutions to the climate crisis. Everywhere radical, essentially anti-capitalist, strategies are emerging, based on other ethics and forms of organization, rather than the profit motive: ecovillages; the new urban environment promoted in Curitiba in Brazil and elsewhere; experiments in permaculture, and community-supported agriculture, farming and industrial cooperatives in Venezuela, etc. The World Social Forum has given voice to many of these aspirations. As leading U.S. environmentalist James Gustave Speth has stated: “The international social movement for change—which refers to itself as ‘the irresistible rise of global anti-capitalism’—is stronger than many may imagine and will grow stronger.”56¶ The reason that the opposition to the logic of capitalism—ultimately seeking to displace the system altogether—will grow more imposing is that there is no alternative, if the earth as we know it, and humanity itself, are to survive. Here, the aims of ecology and socialism will necessarily meet. It will become increasingly clear that the distribution of land as well as food, health care, housing, etc. should be based on fulfilling human needs and not market ¶ forces. This is, of course, easier said than done. But it means making economic decisions through democratic processes occurring at local, regional, and multiregional levels. We must face such issues as: (1) How can we supply everyone with basic human needs of food, water, shelter, clothing, health care, educational and cultural opportunities? (2) How much of the economic production should be consumed and how much invested? and (3) How should the investments be directed? In the process, people must find the best ways to carry on these activities with positive interactions with nature—to improve the ecosystem. New forms of democracy will be needed, with emphasis on our responsibilities to each other, to one’s own community as well as to communities around the world. Accomplishing this will, of course, require social planning at every level: local, regional, national, and international—which can only be successful to the extent that it is of and by, and not just ostensibly for, the people.57

### Case

#### Calls to address specific security threats are key to solve those problems without succumbing to the pratfalls of the Bush Doctrine

Kailyn Nicholson and Anna Schaffer - Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies - 3/10/2011, The Future of U.S. Democracy Promotion: Strategies for a Sustainable Fourth Wave of Democratization, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/16487/Task%20Force%20C%202011%20Web.pdf?sequence=1

Democracy Promotion in Rhetoric The current administration has attempted to steer clear of unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic doctrine. This resolution appears to reflect the Obama administration‘s efforts to disassociate from the Bush-era rhetoric that provoked such global criticism. Post 9/11, the Bush administration was seen to sway between a preemptive realism that sought to unilaterally maintain America‘s position of power in the world and a lofty Wilsonian rhetoric that espoused spreading democratic ideals to all corners of the globe. Especially under Bush‘s Freedom Agenda, supporting democracy and the promotion of freedom was embraced as a foreign policy goal. The Freedom Agenda incorporated or helped to justify the global war on terror and Iraqi invasion. Increasingly weak evidence to support initial justifications for intervention eventually gave way to the language of democracy promotion as a more appealing rhetoric. And, Iraq became the centerpiece of this agenda executed in the name of promoting democratic values and supporting human rights. In his second inaugural address in 2005, former President Bush stated, So it is the policy of the U.S. to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world…We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require decent treatment of their own people. America‘s belief in human dignity will guide our principles (Bush 2005) In claiming that the long-term goal of the U.S. was to end ‗tyranny in our world,‘ Bush set unrealistic and idealized expectations for the results of democracy promotion. Much of the justifications by the Bush administration for democracy promotion asserted the moral grounds for democracy. In a speech at the 2008 World Economic Forum in Sharm el-Sheikh Egypt, former President Bush pronounced: Some say any state that holds an election is a democracy. But true democracy requires vigorous political parties allowed to engage in free and lively debate. True democracy requires the establishment of civic institutions that ensure an election‘s legitimacy and hold leaders accountable. And true democracy requires competitive elections in which opposition candidates are allowed to campaign without fear or intimidation. Too often in the Middle East, politics has consisted of one leader and the opposition in jail. America is deeply concerned about the plight of political prisoners in this region, as well as democratic activists who are intimidated or repressed, newspapers and civil society organizations that are shut down, and dissidents whose voices are stifled. The time has come for nations across the Middle East to abandon these practices, and treat their people with dignity and the respect they deserve (Bush 2008) Here, former President Bush professed to stand behind democratic forces in all states. The fact that this speech took place three years after the 2005 Egyptian presidential election, where one candidate, Ayman Nour, was imprisoned, highlights a thread of hypocrisy in Bush‘s lofty rhetoric. Alternatively, the Obama administration adopted a more realistic rhetoric that gave recognition to other national interests, including security interests and threats to U.S. security. In response to the discourse and policies of the previous administration President Obama stated: Indeed, one of the lessons of our effort in Iraq is that American influence around the world is not a function of military force alone. We must use all elements of our power -- including our diplomacy, our economic strength, and the power of America's example -- to secure our interests and stand by our allies. And we must project a vision of the future that's based not just on our fears, but also on our hopes -- a vision that recognizes the real dangers that exist around the world (Obama 2010) Indeed, Obama‘s rhetoric implies a much more pragmatic approach than that of the previous administration. Here, Obama stated the need for balancing various U.S. interests and real-world threats, while also acknowledging tensions. One critique of Obama states, ―If there is an Obama doctrine emerging, it is one much more realpolitik than his predecessor‘s, focused on relations with traditional great powers and relegating issues like human rights and democracy to second-tier concerns‖ (Baker 2010). However, it should be noted and taken into consideration that pragmatic responses advocated by the Obama administration may have been influenced by the legacy issues left from the previous administration. It is possible the Obama administration has taken a realistic and pragmatic approach because it is an alternative to the last administration. Therefore, it is important to consider how foreign policy is influenced by legacy and also how it may be constrained by reality. In any case, within any administration, Wilsonian ideals and moral values are never to be ignored. In his most recent State of the Union address Obama gave support to human rights and noted: Recent events have shown us that what sets us apart must not just be our power – it must also be the purpose behind it. In south Sudan – with our assistance – the people were finally able to vote for independence after years of war….And we saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator. And tonight, let us be clear: The U.S. of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people (Obama 2011) While Obama does still express support for human rights and democratic values he does so with an air of caution. Unlike the previous administration, this administration refrains from soaring unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic and realistic rhetoric regarding foreign policy and democracy promotion. In doing so, this current administration is seen to be noticeably less hypocritical and inconsistent than the previous. C. Implementation: Rhetoric in Action? In reality U.S. democracy promotion efforts have not reflected the rhetoric surrounding it. Democracy promotion is inconsistent country to country and policy to policy. Actions do not reflect the language expressed by policy makers to support democracy. After the Bush administration it has become increasingly entangled with military interests resulting in the association of democracy promotion with regime change and forceful coercion. Under the façade of democracy promotion, policies may implement a top-down effort supporting supposed democratic leaders rather than fostering democratic values from the bottom-up through civil society. Its exclusiveness and selectiveness is seen when we support democracy in one state and ignore human rights in another. Within the Bush administration a large gap existed between talk and action whether it was the continued cozy relations with the Saudi government, the U.S. embrace of Pakistan‘s former military dictator Pervez Musharraf, or the largely uncritical line toward China‘s continued authoritarianism (Carothers 2007). In the Middle East, the Bush administration later came to characterize its interventionin Iraq as a democratizing mission, when clearly other interests, particularly security interests were involved from the start. Other U.S. autocratic allies in the region felt almost no pressure at all, despite the Bush team‘s grand pronouncements about its commitment to a politically transformed region (Carothers 2007). Instead, the Bush administration worked to tighten relations with allies in the region in an effort to create a friendly coalition of states that would serve as useful partners in the War on Terror and would help to maintain the balance of power as it was in the Middle East. Thus, the statement of principles made by President Bush at the World Economic Forum in Egypt in 2008 rarely applies to Egypt or other U.S. allies in the Middle East. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Ethiopia have all escaped the rhetoric of supporting human rights and democratic values by the Bush administration(Carothers 2007). Indeed, inconsistency between rhetoric and action is widespread; however, inconsistency in rhetoric between private and public audiences also exists. This is a different situation where the U.S. presents public rhetoric of support, for example, in the case of Egypt -prior to the year 2011- but expresses disapproval and criticisms in private. The recent release of WikiLeaks documents has revealed how American diplomats have repeatedly raised concerns with Egyptian officials about jailed dissidents and bloggers. A 2009 cable from U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, highlighted the difficulty of promoting democracy in a state that is both a strategic ally, but also a partial democracy ruled by an oppressive president: We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt, including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE [Government of Egypt] remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, complaining that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's 454-seat parliament (Embassy Cairo. 2009) However, the documents also show that relations between Mubarak and Obama warmed up as a result of Obama playing down what was the so-called ‗name and shame‘ approach of the Bush Administration (Landler and Lehren 2011). The nature of the WikiLeaks documents concerning Egypt draw attention to a balancing of private pressure with strong public support for Mubarak under the current administration-underscoring yet another sign of inconsistency. II. How False U.S. Rhetoric Has Hurt U.S. Reputation and Image While the U.S. has unparalleled economic and military assets, American influence and standing in the world are significantly low. Frequent gaps between rhetoric and behavior, policy changes or even reversals have harmed the U.S. image as an international power and moral figure. This negative image is partially a consequence of false rhetoric. A recent committee on human rights in Washington acknowledged, ―The world is not blind to this double standard. When they see the U.S. promoting human rights, not as a matter of principle but as a matter of convenience, it saps these principles of much of their force, and it makes the U.S. a much less powerful moral force on behalf of the values that this Nation stands for‖ (U.S. 2008). Even among other Western nations, the U.S. is seen to have a weak stance concerning human rights. In 1998, The United States Information Agency (USIA) found that 59 percent of the British and 61 percent of Germans said the U.S. was doing a good job promoting human rights. Today, 56 percent of the British and 78 percent of Germans say the US is doing a bad job (Kull 2007). Clearly, opinions of the U.S. on human rights issues have degraded significantly. An American rhetoric supporting human rights and democratic ideals worldwide while, simultaneously, failing to be consistent in implementing this rhetoric evidently will influence this degradation. The U.S. is viewed as hypocritical in its rhetoric about human rights and democracy because it is seen to be selective in its actual application. American leaders pursue more confrontational strategies for supporting democratic change against those countries with strained relations with the U.S. and adopt policies of engagement to induce or, at times, overlook democratic change with allies and friends. ―Close American relationships with authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and cordial relationships with autocratic rulers in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Equatorial Guinea, undermine U.S. credibility when criticizing similar types of autocratic regimes with less friendly ties to Washington‖ (McFaul 2010,163). Rhetoric about liberty has been juxtaposed with the instability in Iraq and democracy promotion has become associated with regime change. In the past decade, ―the rhetorical conflation by the Bush Administration and its allies of the war in Iraq and democracy promotion has muddied the meaning of the democracy project, diminishing support for it at home and abroad‖ (Melia 2007, 12). Public opinion polls from a 2005 survey by the Pew Research Center found the U.S. to be broadly disliked in most countries surveyed. Furthermore, a degrading trend in U.S. image can be seen as a repercussion of the inconsistency in rhetoric and policy of the past. A poll, conducted for BBC World Service in 18 countries, tracked this issue from 2005-2007. ―On average, positive views of the U.S. have slipped from 40 percent in 2005 to 36 percent in 2006 to 29 percent in 2007. Negative views have risen from 46 percent in 2005 to 52 percent in 2007‖ (Kull 2007). What‘s more, Gallup Polls in 143 countries reveal the image of the leadership of the U.S. is generally poor worldwide, but that the Obama administration will have the most repair work to do on its image in the predominantly Muslim Middle East and North Africa, where regional median approval is just 15 percent (Ray 2009). One year into his term, global opinion polls taken by Gallup reflect a positive view of Obama‘s leadership and foreign policy, yet, still present mixed reviews towards his handlings of trouble spots in the Middle East (English 2010). Such negative views of the U.S. erode U.S. power and undermine U.S. influence abroad. III. Democracy Promotion as a Façade for Promoting Other U.S. Interests The point where democracy promotion rhetoric does not properly align with implementation of supporting democracy, in any given state, is a sign of inconsistency and the use of democracy promotion as a façade for promoting other U.S. interests. Inconsistency between rhetoric and action in democracy promotion highlights the varying and diverse interests of the U.S. where democracy promotion, at times, wrongly serves the purpose of justifying other non-related and sometimes contrary U.S. interests. While the U.S. does wish to support and uphold human rights and the universal concept of economic, social and political freedoms, these interests somehow fall behind other US interests. This raises the questions of: whether U.S. interests are presented as prioritized? And how does one account for the supremacy of security interests over values of supporting human rights and democracy in general? This section will first examine U.S. interests from a Wilsonian, idealist view and next, from a realist view. These two schools of thought concerning foreign policy and inevitably, democracy promotion are today seen to be in opposition with each other. This can be accounted for by the short-term mindset of foreign policy in any given administration. Foreign policy is bound to vary with each new administration, within the same administration or due to a change in the global landscape. A forward-looking foreign policy strategy encourages a balance between interests of supporting human rights and moral values (so called idealist interests), and realist tendencies to focus solely on security and strategic interests. The current strategy, however, juxtaposes these two interest views and prompts a choice between the two. Thus, while it is in U.S. interests in the long-term to promote democracy as an end in itself, U.S. actions concerning democracy promotion currently seem to be motivated and driven by short-term interests. This section will analyze where focus on short-term realist interests has prompted a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. In this manner, democracy promotion is used as a tool, rather than an end, to maintain or secure other strategic interests. What‘s more, efforts to advance democracy and human rights only occur when they are in agreement with other interests. Shortterm realist interests also reveal, in certain cases, that democracy promotion does not even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting democracy. China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Russia, are sites where security and economic interests override the interest of supporting a democracy (Carothers 2007). Furthermore, lack of clarity and consistency in policies has wrongly entangled democracy promotion with military and security interests. Security, for any state, including the U.S. is critical to a state‘s survival. Indeed, first and foremost, security is America‘s primary interest. Michael McFaul notes that the ―central purpose of American power is not to make the world a better place, but first to ensure security, prosperity of American people‖ and the ―paramount objective of American foreign policy must always be to defend the security of the American people‖ (McFaul 2010, 10, 68). Deterring military foes, forging alliances, creating alliances, ensuring stable access to natural resources, creating and maintaining U.S. military bases, expanding trade and investment opportunities abroad all represent strategies to ensure American security and, therefore, generally precede other policies (United States 2010). However, security is not, nor should not, be the sole interest of U.S foreign policy. Foreign policy, must take other interests into account; clearly, ―Not all interests need to be vital to be worthy of American protection‖ (Haass 1995, 48). A. The Case for Wilsonianism A Wilsonian view of foreign policy and also democracy promotion states a U.S. interest in upholding moral values. The U.S. has a moral obligation to human rights, and here democracy promotion is not simply a tool for national interest. Democracy promotion is seen as an end in itself that promotes human rights values, quality of life, economic, political and social liberties. In rhetoric, America‘s stated interests for promoting democracy are normally Wilsonian ideals associated with supporting human empowerment and self-determination and the wish that democratic values are shared globally. Critics have deemed this view to be limited in the scope with which it can substantiate a policy action to promote democracy. Richard Haassargues, ―The principal problem with this thinking is that the active promotion of democracy is a luxury policymakers cannot always afford‖ (Haass 1995, 46). Further critiques note that there may still be instances where national security or economic interests override supporting democratic values. When it comes to human rights, nowhere have the conflicts and contradictions been greater than in Washington‘s dealings with superpowers. Haass continues, ―When it comes to relations with Russia or China, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, other national security interests must normally take precedence over (or at least coexist with) concerns about how they choose to govern themselves. During the early Bush administration certain neo-conservatives appropriated ―the fact that promoting democracy can be difficult and expensive also reduces its attraction as a foreign policy compass‖ as another means to highlight the apparent conflicting interests associated with democracy promotion (Haass 2005). B. The Case for Realism Realists emphasize the balance of U.S. power amongst other global actors through the maintenance of security. ―This theory prescribes that the U.S. has a security interest in increasing its military and economic power and fostering and maintaining alliances with powerful states to check the influence of other great or rising powers‖(McFaul 2010, 76). Above all else, maintaining a balance of power is ideal. U.S. needs access to oil, minerals, basing rights and trade from all countries willing to cooperate, irrespective of whether they are autocratic or democratic. Realists argue that democracy promotion can undermine allies, empower anti-American forces and generate both domestic and international instability. In the case of Egypt, for instance, supporters of Mubarak and Mubarak himself, argued that democratization could give way to the empowerment of non-western friendly actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately destabilize the Middle East region (Embassy Cairo 2010).Haass acknowledges ―The strength of the realist approach is that it does not overlook existing and potential threats to U.S. interests, threats that if they were to materialize could overwhelm policy concerns‖ (Haass 1995, 48). C. Democracy Promotion as a Tool, Rather Than an End Here is where focus on short-term realist interests prompts a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. Under a realist school of thought, democracy promotion is seen as a tool rather than an end. It can be emphasized as a strategy to ideally secure other interests. Consequently, democracy promotion, when it exists, can become entangled with military and security interests; or, democracy promotion may not exist at all where other strategic interests are already present. Still, there are cases where democracy promotion doesn‘t even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting a democracy. U.S. military presence in the Middle East prompts the need for allies in the region. Pakistan represents one instance; Pervez Musharraf maintained control of Pakistan with his power as a military dictator up until the 2008 elections. Security interests as well as economic interests play a significant role in undermining democracy promotion in the Middle East. U.S. oil interests invoke a more hardheaded foreign policy that disregards human rights and quality of life standards in states such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Michael McFaul notes, ―Without the illiberal kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a trade partner today, the U.S. would not have enough affordable energy to support our current way of life‖ (McFaul 2010, 79). On the same note, other countries with limited trade and aid relations to the U.S., such as Syria, will not experience the same policy with the U.S. as does Saudi Arabia, for instance. Economic and strategic interests have, in the past, prevented the U.S. from taking a firm stance against China‘s human rights violations. China, on the contrary, maintains a favored nation status. For the U.S., ―promoting human rights was jettisoned in May 1994 when the need to export to China and engage in a host of strategic efforts proved too significant to set aside‖ (Haass 1995, 53). Indeed U.S. leverage against China‘s human rights violations is supposedly limited due to economic interests that are present. Furthermore, when powers face a challenger to their hegemony, they are more likely to tolerate autocracies that can present themselves as buffer against their rivals (Levitsky and Steven and Way, 2002). The U.S. has been cited for supporting the ‗democrat‘ rather than the democracy where support for autocratic allies is emphasized over support for actual democratic institutions. This policy was seen in Egypt, prior to January 25, 2011, where the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in aid over the past several decades to prop up the Egyptian dictatorship. Supporters of this policy acknowledge the false assumption that elected parties will be in agreement with the U.S. and its foreign policy. They acknowledge that democratic elections could promote the rise of a fascist leader (Kopstein 2006, 89). Mubarak, has been cited frequently for human rights violations; detention, torture, refusal to register opposition political parties were all used by Mubarak as a means to constrain the scope of democracy and prevent a threat to his persistent rule (Untied States 2008). In Egypt, Mubarak profited from this Western concern that Islamists will win a fair election in the country. ―As evidence Mubarak can point to the parliamentary elections of 2005, when candidates backed by the Muslim Brotherhood captured a majority of the seats they contested‖ (United States 2008). Although the U.S. rarely placed pressure on Mubarak publicly, documents from WikiLeaks reveal U.S. pressure on Mubarak to democratize and to improve human rights. Nevertheless, ―U.S. pressure for democratization largely ended with the strong Muslim Brotherhood showing of 2005‖(United States 2008). Instances of supporting autocratic allies have happened frequently in U.S. foreign policy, and present a challenge to the consistency in rhetoric of foreign policy and democracy promotion in the future. D. Entanglement of Democracy Promotion with Military or Security Interests Inconsistency between rhetoric and action can also manifest itself when other U.S. interests, specifically military and security interests, become entangled with the act of promoting democracy. In the past decade, entanglement represents one of the greatest faults to American foreign policy and its association with democracy promotion consequently. Entanglement presented itself most distinctly within Bush‘s Freedom Agenda where military force became an instrument for democracy promotion and democracy promotion became associated with regime change. Here, McFaul comments that “During the Bush administration, the American armed forces assumed a leading role in fostering democratic change (McFaul 2010, 155). At times, the purpose for a military intervention can be disguised under the veil of democracy promotion. Or, similarly, democracy promotion becomes a façade to fulfill other interests, as was seen in Iraq. “The increasingly threadbare nature of initial US justifications for the invasion, (weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq-Al-Qaeda ‘link‘), rendered the language of democracy promotion an attractive fall-back for the administration" (Durac and Cavatorta 2009, 9). A close association between military intervention and democracy promotion overshadows the more traditional and legitimate means for supporting democratic development in other countries. In Iraq, policy makers fell back on democracy when all other legitimate reasons to invade couldn‘t be summoned. In cases like this, the act of using democracy promotion as a façade renders U.S. democracy promotion misleading and unfounded. IV. Undermining U.S. Credibility and Image A. Accusations of Hypocrisy The determinedness with which the Bush administration tied democracy promotion rhetoric to aggressive War on Terror military actions had the opposite of its desired effect. The U.S. had hoped that its preemption policy might be more palatable if couched in values that are almost universally agreed upon, like freedom and democracy. President Bush‘s statement ―For the sake of our long-term security, all free nations must stand with the forces of democracy and justice that have begun to transform the Middle East‖ implies that the U.S.‘s involvement in the Middle East is consistently aimed at supporting democratic movements. However, the fact that security is a much more immediate concern in military conflicts meant that, in practice, democracy was not the primary consideration when it came to which governments to support and which to challenge. Egypt, for example, is a close U.S. ally and enjoyed generous military support throughout the freedom agenda years despite being decisively authoritarian. On the other hand, the U.S. refused to support Hamas although it was democratically elected by the Palestinian people. While both of these decisions make sense from a geopolitical/security perspective, they do not fit the democracy promotion agenda. When President Bush made universal statements about democracy promotion while at the same time supporting non-democracies and failing to support all functioning democracies for security reasons, the international community recognized the hypocrisy. B. Accusations of Hubris Another way in which U.S. democracy promotion rhetoric helped undermine our credibility and image abroad has been by declaring success, or at least marked progress, in places where democracy, if it exists at all, is not functioning enough to improve the quality of life of citizens. By calling these examples successful, the U.S. either looks disturbingly out of touch or too haughty to admit the shortcomings of its democracy promotion efforts. Iraq is an excellent example of this, as Frank Rich of the New York Times points out: ―Iraq‘s ‗example of freedom,‘‖ as President Bush referred to his project in nation building and democracy promotion, did not inspire other states in the Middle East to emulate it. If Iraq is an example of success, who indeed would volunteer to be the next patient of U.S. democracy promotion? There are many other examples stretching back before the Bush era of similarly willfully inaccurate statements. Thomas Carothers points to the Congo, Cambodia, and Soviet-free Afghanistan as cases where the U.S. stubbornly congratulated themselves on progress that, to the rest of the world, looked like tragedy. Setting unrealistic expectations for the results of democracy promotion, such as President Bush‘s ―long-term goal of ending tyranny in our world, ―are another form of this hubris (Bush 2005). These two types of misleading rhetoric create a very stark image of U.S. democracy promotion in the eyes of the rest of the world. The U.S. claims to stand behind democratic forces in all states, but does not follow through when more immediate strategic concerns are present. Actions claimed to be democracy promotion are implemented with military coercion and claimed as successes even if they fail to provide security or stability for the country‘s citizens, and, in the case of Iraq, actively destabilize a region. As a result, ―the credibility of the US as an agent of democracy promotion in the Middle East is called into question, both within the region and without‖ (Bali and Rana, 2010). V. Implications for Diplomatic Effectiveness: Realism The preceding mistakes have resulted in ―Obama and his foreign-policy team edge[ing] away from the language of democracy promotion, which they fear that the Freedom Agenda has rendered toxic. (Taub 2009)‖ The new administration may feel the need to avoid Bush-era rhetoric that engendered so much criticism, but the associations of U.S. democracy promotion with aggressive militarism, hypocrisy, and arrogance will not disappear overnight. They must be replaced by a strong, realistic redefinition of what democracy promotion means to the U.S., when and how it will be practiced, and when it must take a backseat to other more immediate concerns. Once the U.S. rhetorically embraces realistic standards, it will be possible for policy and rhetoric to be consistent. This will present a reasonable face for U.S. democracy promotion, encouraging cooperation and discussion rather than avoidance or presumptive opposition. This is something U.S. policymakers should be concerned with for more substantive reasons than international popularity. Being seen as hypocritical and arrogant strengthens the case of foreign leaders seeking to oppose U.S. policy, both in international forums and bilateral relations. The U.S.‘s ability to achieve foreign policy objectives- be they economic, military, or geopolitical- is materially harmed by the perception that we have qualities undesirable in a working relationship. Unrealistic assessment of outcomes, inconsistency, unwillingness to recognize areas of weakness, and arrogance are all characteristics that do not invite support and cooperation. Indeed, McFaul asserts the Bush administration‘s rhetoric and policy in the Middle East were damaging to the U.S.‘s ability to realize foreign policy goals to the extent that they formed ―a serious impasse between the White House and all other international organizations, which subsequently tried to steer clear of associating with Bush policies, including his freedom agenda‖ (McFaul 2010, 218). It clearly follows that all U.S foreign policy goals are served by a positive and respected image abroad, because other states and international organizations are more willing to cooperate with policies when they have a positive image of U.S. goals and methods for achieving them. Certain aspects of democracy promotion have been identified as contributing to a negative image abroad:  Aggression/militarism  Unwarranted declarations of success/denial of mistakes  Inconsistency o Between rhetoric and action Between standards for various states Accordingly, attempts to foster a more positive, cooperative image should involve amending democracy promotion policy to be more:  Peaceful and non-coercive  Realistic o In assessments of progress and willingness to discuss/learn from mistakes o Rhetoric able to be achieved with action o Policies capable of being applied consistently across cases (flexible, humble) Incorporating these guidelines into a new coherent democracy promotion strategy will help the Obama administration avoid the backlash against Bush era mistakes. As previously mentioned Obama is already bringing his democracy promotion rhetoric down to a more realistic level, but he has not fully embraced all the changes necessary for a new effective era of democracy promotion. His administration‘s handling of the recent Egyptian protests is an indication of the need for clear, consistent rhetoric that can be employed in situations where democracy promotion and other interests conflict. This is already acknowledged in private. A cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in Egypt in 2008 admits that ―An ongoing challenge remains balancing our security interests with our democracy promotion efforts.‖ Yet instead of openly addressing this conflict in statements on Egypt‘s unfolding revolution, President Obama delivered ―ambiguous messages about an orderly transition‖ (Embassy Cairo 2008). More than two weeks into the protests, he issued a statement saying ―the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people‖ (Obama 2011). While this is certainly an improvement on former president Bush‘s coercive and idealistic rhetoric, it does not provide a clear policy on democracy promotion and its limitations. Inherent in the statement is a message of non-coercion, acknowledgement of the unpredictability of democratization efforts, and an unwillingness to burn bridges with current government authorities. All of these considerations should be stated publicly and result from a clearly defined U.S. policy on democracy promotion that commits to realistic goals and recognizes that other interests like regional security must play a role in immediate decisions without endangering the long-term process of democratization. A. Non-coercion: Separating Immediate Security Concerns from Democracy Promotion Efforts As later sections of this paper will discuss, successful democratization is a long-term process requiring diverse economic and civil society development. While it is possible to destabilize a dictatorial regime through military or economic coercion, removing one undemocratic government does not automatically- or even usually- usher a functioning democracy into power. Therefore coercion is rarely a useful tool in democracy promotion efforts. More frequently, as described earlier in the chapter, democracy promotion ends up being used as a justification for otherwise unpopular coercive actions. Iraq is the most recent and most blatant example of military coercion justified by democracy promotion rhetoric, but understood by most politicians to be a strategic attempt to gain influence in the oil-rich Middle East. Cuba provides an excellent example of economic coercion in the name of democracy. If the sanctions imposed by the U.S. really were an attempt to force a democratic transition, the decades of unperturbed socialism since their implementation would have proven this method a failure. The fact that the embargo remains intact proves other strategic interests are at stake. If the U.S. can refrain from using democracy promotion rhetoric to justify coercive policies, foreign governments and citizens will be less likely to balk at the idea of allowing the U.S. influence in their country. Later sections of this paper will elaborate on strategies for peaceful and non-coercive democracy promotion. This should be a policy that the U.S. is firmly committed to. Not only does it adhere to a basic moral commitment to human rights, peace, and stability, as outlined previously, by showing respect for state sovereignty and international cooperation it will also increase the ability of the U.S. to achieve foreign policy goals through diplomatic channels. Matthew Longo agrees that ―Without question, military power is important, but it is not the only road forward. Nor is it always the best agent for change. The message of democracy-promotion abroad is not well-delivered from the opposite end of a gun‖ (Longo 2010). This is not a call for the U.S. to withdraw its foreign military presence or adopt a pacifist attitude; far from it. It simply urges that democracy promotion rhetoric not be used as a decoration to make military action more palatable. Security rhetoric can be militant, but for the sake of effectiveness in the international arena, democracy promotion rhetoric should be non-coercive. B. Achievable Rhetoric The second point, realistic assessment of progress in democracy promotion efforts, is crucial in order to achieve consistency between rhetoric and action. If the government makes grandiose statements about democracy promotion, as were common under Bush‘s Freedom Agenda, it will be hard pressed to live up to them. Eliminating tyranny entirely is a noble goal, as is supporting all democratic movements worldwide, but the truth is that the U.S. government is in no position to actually do either of those things. It cannot achieve consistency between rhetoric and action if rhetoric is unrealistic. This is not to say that there is no place for lofty or inspiring language. On the contrary, it often plays an important role in motivating populations to organize for democratic change. What is essential is that lofty rhetoric not be confused with actual commitments to act or expected outcomes of an action. For example, instead of claiming a completely free and democratic Middle East to be the goal of a policy like the Freedom Agenda, U.S. politicians could state that all citizens of Middle Eastern states deserve to have their basic rights and freedoms protected by accountable, responsive governments. It is entirely possible to reinforce a commitment to human rights and quality of life for all people without making specific claims about the U.S.‘s own power to reshape the world as it sees fit. C. Realism Allows for Consistency In addition to rhetoric about goals and actions being realistic in scope, it must also be as consistent as possible with actual U.S. interests, policies, and actions. Clearly this is not possible in all areas of foreign policy, particularly security and intelligence, but for democracy promotion it is largely possible and in fact helpful in many ways. Cavatorta and Durac point out that often, ―rather than being interested in democratic reform for its own sake, the US propounds democracy in the hope and expectation that it will deliver outcomes which the US desires.‖ It is important not to confuse democracy promotion for its own sake with democracy promotion used as part of a strategy to make a state less hostile to U.S. interests, be they economic, military, or political. This distinction is important because, as previously stated, democracy promotion is a long-term and contextually sensitive project and is unlikely to succeed as part of a short-term effort to affect specific strategic variables. Thus, if democracy promotion is tied to such projects rhetorically, it will seem to have a low success rate and diminish our credibility. If, however, it is made clear that the U.S. is seeking a strategic outcome, for instance permission to build a military base in a foreign state, and democracy promotion is one of many tools being employed to towards this end, no unrealistic expectations are raised. In this case, the U.S. appears pragmatic rather than blindly optimistic. Being clear and realistic rhetorically about the desired short-term and long-term outcomes of policies will improve the image of the U.S. as an international actor and restore credibility to its democracy promotion efforts. When democracy promotion is indeed the priority of a given project, it will be more successful and contribute to a more admirable and diplomatically effective U.S. when mistakes are recognized, discussed in a cooperative forum, and amended for future projects. Democracy promotion, like any process, will stagnate if unsuccessful models are ignored and allowed to proliferate because of a desire to save face. It is time to stop ―using transitional language to characterize countries that in no way conform to any democratization paradigm‖ and earn back the respect of the democracy promotion community (Carothers 2007, 4). D. Realism Encourages Multilateral Cooperation A further benefit to realistic assessments of progress beyond image repair is the possibility for greater international cooperation on democracy promotion projects. Discussions among democracy promoters about the successes and challenges of particular cases will not only foster a sense of shared goals, but also allow for faster and more effective revisions of unsuccessful tactics. Multilateralism has many benefits that will be more thoroughly discussed later in the paper, but most simply it will make us less vulnerable to accusations of arrogance. Exemplifying the willingness to cooperate and take criticism that we would like to see in other states will only bolster our credibility and effectiveness in the diplomatic arena. VI. Conclusion Improving the image of the U.S. abroad will increase its effectiveness in all aspects of foreign policy. Creating a clear, consistent democracy promotion policy that recognizes the need to compromise between immediate strategic interests and long-term democratization efforts is necessary to eliminate accusations of hubris and hypocrisy so common since the Bush Administration‘s Freedom Agenda. President Obama has made steps in the right direction, but has yet to present a cohesive, transparent democracy promotion policy to the public.